This paper develops a model of active asset management in which fund managers may forego alpha-generating strategies, and prefer instead to take negativealpha trades that enable them to temporarily manipulate the investors' perception of their skills. We show that such "fake alpha" is optimally generated by taking on hidden tail risk, and that it is more likely to occur when fund managers are impatient, their trading skills are scalable, and generate a high profit per unit of risk. We exhibit long-term contracts that deter this behavior by dynamically adjusting the dates at which the manager is compensated in response to her cumulative performance.
Introduction
The last thirty years have witnessed two important evolutions in financial markets. First, a rapid pace of financial innovation has made it possible to slice and combine a large variety of risks by trading a rich set of financial instruments. Second, the management of large amounts of capital has been delegated to entities, such as hedge funds and bank proprietary desks, that are neither subject to significant trading restrictions, nor required to publicly disclose the details of their positions.
The amount of capital available to such entities crucially depends on investors' perception of their "alpha" -that is, their ability to generate excess returns above a fair compensation for risk. Combined with the relative opaqueness of these entities and their vast risk-taking opportunities, this creates room for a particular type of agency problem.
Fund managers running out of alpha-generating strategies may find it tempting to pretend otherwise, and to take risky positions with zero or even negative alpha that may temporarily improve their perceived reputation in case of favorable outcomes. Strategies that generate frequent small positive excess returns that are offset by very rare and large losses seem especially well suited to disguise luck as skill. As Rajan (2008) puts it: "How can untalented investment managers justify their pay? Unfortunately, all too often it is by creating fake alpha -appearing to create excess returns but actually taking on hidden tail risk." Consistent with this view, Jiang and Kelly (2012) show that a significant number of hedge funds are indeed exposed to tail risk.
Creating fake alpha by taking on hidden tail risk does not seem to be limited only to the hedge fund industry. For example, in its 2008 report to shareholders meant to analyze the causes of its subprime losses, UBS concludes that "The UBS compensation and incentivisation structure did not effectively differentiate between the creation of alpha versus the creation of return based on a low cost of funding." More systematically, Acharya, Cooley, Richardson and Walter (2010) argue that manufacturing of tail risk through deliberate retention of senior tranches on poor collateral by U.S. banks was an important ingredient of the 2008 banking crisis.
The perverse incentives to enter into (at best) zero-alpha gambles come at several costs. First, they defeat the purpose of delegated asset management, which is meant to optimally combine "brains and resources" to achieve superior returns. Second, they lead to capital misallocation. Finally, manufacturing of tail risk has far-reaching consequences for overall financial stability, and for the taxpayer when the gambling institutions benefit from public safety nets, either by law or because they are systemically important.
The goal of this paper is to develop a new framework for the study of these risktaking incentives. We investigate when rational managers find it optimal to forego alpha and inefficiently gamble instead, so as to manipulate the beliefs of their rational suppliers of capital. We also study whether it is possible to eliminate such risk-taking incentives with optimal contracting given the vast array of trading instruments available to modern fund managers who enjoy limited liability.
Our model builds upon the frictionless benchmark of Berk and Green (2004) , who study career concerns in delegated fund management. As in their model, a fund manager and investors discover the manager's alpha-generating skills by observing her realized returns. The excess returns that a manager is expected to generate increase with respect to her skills, but decrease as she gets more funds under management. The fund size that optimally trades off scale and unit return increases with respect to the manager's skills. Competitive investors supply funds to the manager until they earn a zero net (after fees) expected return. In the beginning of each period, the manager sets fees that enable her to reach the optimal fund size, and extract the entire surplus that she generates. Thus, social learning and competition among investors imply that both fund flows and managerial compensation strongly depend on the trading record.
We add the following friction to this model. We suppose that the manager may secretly enter into zero-alpha trades for the sole purpose of manipulating the investors' perception of her skills. In what follows, we refer to this opportunistic behavior as inefficient risk shifting or gambling. In contrast to many earlier papers on risk shifting, we consider a general setting in which the fund manager can secretly choose to take on positions with any arbitrary payoff distributions. This captures the large set of trading opportunities available to modern managers, and therefore, is an important case to tackle.
We first study the impact of this friction in the case in which the manager and investors sign only short-term contracts. Three factors that are conducive to inefficient risk shifting emerge from our analysis. The first one is the size of the alpha per unit of risk that can be generated by a skilled manager. If it is large, the history of returns has a large impact on investors' beliefs about the manager's ability to generate future excess returns. The second factor is the scalability of trading skills -that is, the sensitivity of expected excess returns to fund size. If trading skills are scalable, a good reputation translates into large future fund size and thus into large future profits. Finally, because the manager can manipulate her reputation only temporarily, she finds it more valuable to do so when she is more impatient. These three factors determine the convexity of future expected gains as a function of realized returns, and thus affect inefficient risk-shifting incentives. In particular, the model predicts that "fallen-star" managers (managers with a high initial potential who realize disappointing returns) are particularly prone to gambling. For a calibration consistent with that by Berk and Green (2004) , we find that their efficient equilibrium with short-term contracts breaks down, in the sense that any equilibrium must feature some degree of risk shifting.
We are able to fully characterize such equilibria with risk shifting in a simplified version of the model, where the manager simply maximizes a combination of her expected current return and the expected reputation that results from it. Interestingly, even though we do not impose any restriction on the risk profiles available to the manager, we show that she finds it optimal to manufacture hidden tail risk. That is, she sells disaster insurance, and adds some noisy payoff to the collected premium so that investors cannot discover the exact nature of the trade.
We then study long-term contracts. We perform two distinct exercises. First, we consider a contract which is popular in the hedge fund industry, in which the manager's profits are given by a performance fee above a high-water mark. Similar to Panageas and Westerfield (2007) , we find that without new inflows/outflows triggered by realized performance, the performance fee with high-water mark is not conducive to inefficient risk shifting. The analysis in the presence of fund flows reveals, however, that the high-water mark contract does not generally solve the risk-shifting problem.
Second, we exhibit an optimal contract that fully eliminates risk-shifting incentives. The contract is designed to discriminate skills from luck. It exploits the fact that the impact of gambling on investors' beliefs vanishes in the long-run, when true skills are eventually revealed. The contract consists in deferring payments to the manager at dates that are revised based on her cumulative performance. The promised payment also evolves so as to always at least match the managers' outside options, and thus lead her to not renegotiate the contract. As we detail in Section 3, this mechanism is highly reminiscent of the recent proposals for bankers' compensation reforms issued by both public authorities and the industry. They all consist in a deferral of bonuses together with a clawback mechanism ensuring that the initial promised payment is revised with the benefit of hindsight. We offer theoretical foundations for these proposals. More importantly, we qualify them, and suggest in particular that it is important to dynamically adjust the timing of compensation, notably by further postponing it upon observing a poor track record. In our model, committing to pay a bonus at a fixed date may generate inefficient gambling in general, even if this date is remote and if the bonus is adjusted with a clawback provision. The dynamic revision of the payment date turns out to be important, and yet is absent from current proposed reforms. This paper is the first, to our knowledge, to formally derive a connection between fund managers' career concerns and alpha-faking through hidden tail risk in a fully rational environment. More precisely, we bridge two strands of literature: the literature on risk shifting and the literature on career concerns. The risk-shifting friction was first introduced by Jensen and Meckling (1976) as a source of value destruction within overly leveraged firms. Arguably, this friction is particularly relevant in the context of sophisticated financial institutions that can swiftly alter their risk profiles. Accordingly, a large asset-pricing literature studies the impact of nonconcave objective functions on the risk-shifting incentives of fund managers who have access to dynamically complete markets. Contributions include Basak, Pavlova, and Shapiro (2007), Carpenter (2000) , and Ross (2004) . Like this literature, we seek to identify the risk-taking strategies that optimally respond to nonconcave objectives. We extend this line of research in two directions. First, nonconcavities in the manager's objective are not assumed in our model. Rather, they arise endogenously from reputational concerns in a truly dynamic environment. Second, we exhibit optimal contracts that eliminate the costs of this friction.
Acharya, Pagano, and Volpin (2012) also develop a model in which career concerns may lead managers to destroy value, but through a different channel from that of manipulating a payoff distribution. As in our model, limited commitment prevents managers from receiving insurance against the risk that their reputation deteriorates. By assumption, learning about managerial skills can take place only if managers run the same project for sufficiently long. Thus risk-averse managers may prefer to churn across projects so as to prevent learning. This shields them from reputation risk, but inefficiently slows down the identification of good managers. Malliaris and Yan (2012) study a two-period model in which a manager may be tempted to take on tail risk so as to manipulate her expected reputation. Their setup is related to the static version of our model for which we solve for equilibria with risk shifting. The main difference is that we do not impose binary payoffs as they do.
Our paper is also related to Goetzmann, Ingersoll, Spiegel and Welch (2007) who study manipulation-proof measures of managerial performance. They show that to be manipulation-proof a measure should take the form of a concave utility function averaged over return history. We also show that if the fund manager has nonconcave continuation utility she can engage in inefficient risk shifting, and that optimal contracts aim at concavifying the manager's objective.
Finally, our study relates to two recent extensions of the Berk and Green (2004) model. First, Berk and Stanton (2007) apply the Berk and Green setup to closed-end funds. In this case, learning affects the net asset value of the fund and not its size, which is fixed by construction. Berk and Stanton show that the impact of learning explains several features of the closed-end fund discount, and that the behavior of this discount crucially depends on the nature of the compensation contract. Second, Dangl, Wu, and Zechner (2010) study an extension of Berk and Green in which a management company can fire a manager if her performance is not good enough. They restrict the analysis to short-term compensation contracts and solve for the optimal firing rule.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops our baseline model of career concerns, and studies the impact of the risk-shifting friction when the manager and investors sign only short-term contracts. Section 3 studies long-term contracts. Section 4 concludes. Technical proofs are relegated to the appendix.
Career Concerns and Inefficient Risk Shifting
In Subsection 2.1, we introduce and solve a frictionless model of career concerns in delegated asset management that closely follows Berk and Green (2004) . In Subsection 2.2, we introduce a risk-shifting friction in this benchmark, and study its impact on the equilibrium in the presence of short-term contracts. Finally, Subsection 2.3 fully characterizes equilibria with risk shifting in a simplified version of our baseline model.
Frictionless Benchmark: The Berk and Green (2004) model
Time is discrete and is indexed by {n∆t} , where n ∈ N and ∆t > 0. There is a single consumption good which serves as the numéraire. Agents are of two types: a manager and investors. Agents live forever, are risk-neutral, and discount future consumption at the instantaneous rate r > 0.
The manager is protected by limited liability: She cannot have negative consumption. Investors receive a large endowment of the consumption good at each date n∆t, the manager does not. The manager has exclusive access to an investment technology. If the manager invests q t consumption units at date t using her technology, she generates q t+∆t units at date t + ∆t such that
where (B t ) t≥0 is a standard Wiener process, and a and σ are strictly positive numbers. The parameter θ ∈ {0, 1} measures the manager's skills. It is unobservable by both the manager and investors. All other parameters are common knowledge. The parameter a is the alpha that a skilled manager can generate with her first dollar. As in Berk and Green (2004) , the cost c(q t ) captures that many arbitrage opportunities or informational rents in financial markets are not perfectly scalable. The function c is increasing, of the form
where α ≥ 1, β > 0. All agents share the common date -0 prior that the manager is endowed with high skills -that is, that θ = 1 -with probability π 0 ∈ (0, 1). Except for the manager's skills, each action and the manager's realized returns are publicly observable at each date n∆t. Thus, information is symmetric across agents.
Let π t denote the probability that the agents assign to the possibility that the manager is skilled at a given date t. We will refer to π t as the manager's perceived skills. Given π t = π, the net expected surplus created over [t, t + ∆t] if the manager invests q units is q πe (a−c(q))∆t + (1 − π)e −c(q)∆t − 1 , which in the limit as ∆t → 0 becomes q (aπ − c(q)) . Thus the manager creates the maximal net expected surplus over [t, t + ∆t] if she invests q (π) that solves
We will refer to such q(π) as the optimal fund size. Denoting v(π)∆t the maximal expected profit over [t, t + ∆t] that corresponds to this optimal fund size, we have:
Proof. See Appendix.
With a power specification (2.2) for the cost function c(q), the expected instantaneous surplus v (π) is proportional to π α as ∆t becomes small. The parameter α captures the scalability of trading skills. As α increases, the manager's skills π become more scalable and therefore, her expected profit becomes more sensitive to her reputation, that is, more convex in π. In the hedge fund universe, global macro strategies are typically quite scalable. On the other hand, strategies based on shareholder activism may be more difficult to spread over increasing amounts of capital. Berk and Green specify a linear cost function c corresponding to α = 2. They show that their model matches quantitatively well the empirically observed relationship between mutual funds realized returns and inflows/outflows. In the remainder of the paper, we will often restrict the analysis to a somewhat simpler limiting case in which α = 1. In this case, the cost is zero for q < 1 and infinite for q > 1. Thus, the manager can scale up the fund at no cost up to an upper bound that is (without loss of generality) normalized to 1. The optimal fund size is thus always 1 and v(π) is linear in π. In other words, in this case, perceived skills affect the expected rate of return on the fund but the optimal fund size remains a constant normalized to 1.
To realize any surplus, investors have to delegate their funds to the manager and agree with her on the profit sharing rule. We assume that investors are competitive and can fully commit to a contract. At the same time, at the end of any period, the fund manager is free to walk away from a contract and sign a new one with competing investors. More precisely, at the end of each period [t, t + ∆t] , after returns are realized and all contractual transfers for the period are made, the fund manager is free to terminate a contract without financial obligation to its investors, and to enter a new one with new investors starting at period [t + ∆t, t + 2∆t]. In other words, commitment is one-sided. This is a usual assumption in labor economics. We find it to be all the more plausible in the financial services industry where fund managers can swiftly move across jobs and financial centres because their activity requires few specific investments. Limited cross-border enforcement precludes covenants that would make such moves very costly.
We first study incentives to take risk when investors and the manager cannot enter into long-term contracts, but rather simply interact in a spot labor market at each date. Our goal is to determine whether incentives created by market forces alone discipline managers who are concerned about their reputations in the labor market Thus, we postpone the analysis of explicit long-term contracts until Section 3, and instead assume, as Berk and Green do, that the manager enters only into one-period contracts with investors: Assumption 1 At each date t, the manager offers investors a one-period asset management contract.
Assumption 1 only imposes a restriction on the horizon of contracts: The parties cannot contract at date t on actions or transfers beyond date t + ∆t. Parties are free to write any one-period contracts, however, subject only to the limited-liability constraint of the manager. We show next that this restriction to short-term contracts does not lead to any misallocation of capital in the absence of frictions.
Lemma 2 Under Assumption 1, the manager adopts the optimal fund size q(π) at each date and extracts the maximal expected surplus v(π)∆t.
Proof. One only needs to exhibit a particular contractual arrangement that enables the manager to raise q(π) at each period, and to receive an expected compensation v(π)∆t over [t, t + ∆t]. Absent any frictions, there are many different arrangements that can achieve this. For example, the manager can simply ask investors at the beginning of each period to pay her a salary v(π)∆t, collect funds q(π) from them, invest, and leave them the date -(t + ∆t) proceeds. She may alternatively, as is assumed in Berk and Green (2004) , quote a fee f ∆t at the beginning of each period. The fee is the fraction of the date -(t + ∆t) assets under management (before new inflows/outflows of funds) that accrues to the manager. If a manager with perceived skills π quotes a fee f ∆t, competitive investors will supply funds as long as their net expected rate of return is equal to r. Thus, their fund supply q (f ) solves
Therefore as ∆t → 0, q (f ) solves
The manager maximizes her expected profits by choosing f such that:
which implies that the manager collects the maximal expected surplus v(π)∆t. QED This baseline model is essentially identical to the model of Berk and Green (2004) . The main modelling difference is that the distribution of skills is binomial in our setup while it is Gaussian in theirs. With our specification, the model is stationary in perceived skills π, and is therefore more tractable. In particular, this specification yields a tractable formulation of the manager's total expected profit from date 0 on. While this is not particularly useful in the frictionless environment of Berk and Green, this will turn out to be instrumental when we introduce asymmetric information between the manager and investors.
Let (π n∆t ) n≥0 denote the process that describes the manager's perceived skills at each date. From Lemma 2, the manager's continuation utility is
where v(π) is given by (2.4). The following proposition shows that this continuation utility converges to a simple limit when ∆t becomes small.
Proposition 1 Let
We have
where
and
Convergence of V (π, ∆t) to V (π) when ∆t → 0 is uniform over π ∈ (0, 1) .
In the remainder of the paper, all results will be established for ∆t sufficiently small, so that we can approximate the manager's continuation utility with its continuous-time limit (2.6).
Expression (2.6) can be interpreted as an expectation over the instantaneous surplus v (x) weighted by a discount factor G(π, x). The factor G(π, x) has an intuitive interpretation: It measures the discounted frequency of the future dates at which the manager will have a perceived ability x given that she starts out with perceived skills π. Notice that the factor G depends only on a/σ, which governs the speed at which agents learn about the manager's skills, and on the discount rate r. The cost parameters α and β affect only the instantaneous profit v from (2.4). This is because the cost is known and thus filtered out by the agents when inferring skills from realized returns. It is easy to verify that
Thus, in the case α = 1, the continuation utility V (π) is proportional to π because so is v. In this case, the continuation utility therefore follows a martingale as the history of returns unfolds and learning takes place. Finally, it is also interesting to point out that if r → 0, then ψ → 1, and all the contribution to the continuation utility comes from what the manager gets when her skill level is either 0 or 1. This is again intuitive because in the long-run, there is a complete revelation of the manager's skills.
We now depart from this frictionless benchmark set by Berk and Green, and introduce informational asymmetry between the manager and investors. We posit that the manager may secretly enter into zero-alpha trades in order to temporarily manipulate his perceived skills rather than efficiently invest in the alpha-generating technology described in (2.1). We will show that the spot labour market interactions considered thus far may generate perverse incentives in the presence of this friction.
Risk Shifting
The Berk and Green model assumes a frictionless interaction between the manager and investors. While this is a very useful benchmark, in reality, several informational frictions may affect the delegation of asset management to sophisticated entities such as hedge funds and investment banks. As the following quote from the Financial Stability Forum "Principles for Sound Compensation Practices" suggests, the impossibility to perfectly monitor shifts in risk exposures within such institutions can be particularly problematic:
In principle, if risk management and control systems were strong and highly effective, the risk-taking incentives provided by compensation systems would not matter because risk would stay within the firm's appetite. In practice, all risk management and control systems have limitations and, as the current crisis has shown, they can fail to properly control risks. The incentives provided by compensation can be extremely powerful. Without attention to the risk implications of the compensation system, risk management and control systems can be overwhelmed, evaded, or captured by risk-takers.
To study such incentives to surreptitiously shift risk exposures, we introduce the following friction to the baseline model:
Assumption 2 (Risk-shifting technology). At each date, the manager can secretly invest all or part of her funds in an alternative technology whose returns are perfectly scalable and independent from the returns on the technology described in (2.1). This technology enables her to generate a one-period gross return with any arbitrary distribution over [0, ∞) with mean e r ∆t , where r ≤ r. Investors observe returns realized at the reporting and contracting dates n∆t, at which the manager's position is marked-tomarket.
Let us briefly comment on our modelling choice. We interpret the alpha-generating technology (2.1) available to the manager as the investment strategy that she agrees upon with the investors and/or her supervisors. In practice this strategy may vary over time, and involve shifts in asset selection, asset allocation, or overall risk exposure. But such shifts are agreed upon between the parties. For simplicity, we abstract from them and, following Berk and Green, we model this agreed upon trading strategy as a simple production function (2.1).
The "risk-shifting" technology that the manager may secretly use reflects the positions that she can conceal from the investors and /or her supervisors by evading the various control and risk management systems put in place to monitor her. To make our results sharper, we assume that these trades are detrimental to investors in that they do not generate a positive risk-adjusted expected excess return. Moreover, we allow for the possibility that concealing these trades from investors comes at a cost r − r . The assumption that these trades are independent from the alpha-generating technology ensures that they cannot be used for arbitrage purposes. Because such trades yield less in expectation than the manager's alpha-generating technology (2.1), she would not invest her own funds into them. In the presence of career concerns, however, the manager may be tempted to use the "risk-shifting" technology because it provides her with an opportunity to manipulate investors' beliefs about her reputation.
Given the large set of trading opportunities available to sophisticated managers, we consider a general setting in which the fund manager can secretly choose any arbitrary payoff distribution. One of the questions we are interested in is to understand which trades work best to manipulate investors' beliefs. We assume perfect scalability of these trades for expositional simplicity. It is straightforward to extend our analysis to the case in which large trades are more difficult to hide than small trades.
The manager in our model may be literally interpreted as an individual trader, it may also be a desk or a division that collectively decides to breach its mandate or exceed its risk limits. In the remainder of the paper, we refer to the secret use of this inefficient technology by the manager, as opposed to the transparent risk taking induced by the alpha-generating technology (2.1), as "risk shifting" or "gambling".
We now study whether the friction introduced in Assumption 2 affects the outcomes in the Berk and Green environment with short-term contracts (Assumption 1). The first type of opportunistic behaviour that can happen is if the manager secretly invests a portion of her funds at the risk-free rate r instead of using her alpha-generating technology. This represents the situation of a manager who has a good performance, say, over January to November, and then prefers to stop investing actively so as to lock in a profit. We have the following result.
Proposition 2 If
then the manager does not secretly invest at the risk-free rate.
The remainder of the paper focuses on situations in which the manager uses the risk-shifting technology to increase risk rather than reduce it. We believe that this is a more important question because such excessive risk-taking, as the recent crisis suggests, may contribute to financial instability. Thus, we assume in what follows that condition (2.10) holds.
We now characterize the manager's incentives to secretly (and inefficiently) gamble. Suppose that the economy is in an equilibrium in which investors believe that the manager always invests in the alpha-generating technology (2.1). We study whether the manager would be tempted to deviate and enter into a one-shot gamble.
Suppose therefore that the manager gambles during her first trading round, realizes a return R, and from then on no longer gambles. Suppose that investors believe instead that she has never gambled. Let π n∆t be the manager's (correct) belief about her skills at date n∆t and let π R n∆t be investors' (incorrect) perception of her skills at date n∆t. We have
Remark. In principle, a realization of R = 0 should perfectly reveal to investors that the manager gambled because her alpha-generating technology delivers strictly positive returns with probability one. We assume instead that π R t is continuous at zero, so that investors infer π = 0 from observing R = 0. Equivalently, we could assume that traders who get caught gambling are excluded from the market.
The continuation utility of the manager after the return R is realized is
For ∆t small, (2.6) and (2.11) imply that:
The manager thus chooses a unit mean gamble whose distribution maximizes her expectation over W (π, R). Formally, denoting M the set of Borelian probability measures over [0, +∞), she solves
In the electronic appendix, we show that the generic solution to (2.13) is attained with a binary gamble -or a measure comprised of two atoms, one above 1 and the other below. If these two atoms coincide at 1, then the manager does not find it worthwhile to gamble, and an equilibrium without inefficient risk shifting can be sustained. If they do not, then the optimal binary gamble is not degenerate, which means that such an equilibrium without risk shifting does not exist.
Obviously, a sufficient condition that makes gambling undesirable is that W (π, R) be concave in R. More generally, the optimal gamble is determined by the convexity properties of W (π, R), which in turn depend on the parameters a, σ, α, and r. We have the following result.
Proposition 4 Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold.
then there exists an equilibrium in which the manager extracts the entire expected surplus and does not engage in risk shifting.
then such an equilibrium does not exist.
Notice first that the parameter r is irrelevant to determine the manager's incentives to gamble. This is because a one-shot gamble becomes an instantaneous fair lottery as ∆t → 0. To gain intuition for the results in Proposition 4, suppose that the manager tries to "pick up nickels in front of a steamroller", that is, she gambles and realizes an instantaneous return of 1 + ε with probability 1/(1 + ε), where ε is small, or loses everything. Then from (2.11), in case of success, her new reputation is
, which for π and ε small enough is approximately
Further, Lemma 6 in the Appendix shows that if r is not too small, then the continuation utility of the manager V (π) behaves as π α as π → 0. Therefore, the manager's net expected gain from the gamble for π and ε small enough is proportional to
Thus whether there is risk shifting or not depends on whether the ratio αa/σ 2 is greater or less than 1. Proposition 4 shows that risk shifting is particularly appealing when three conditions are met. First, managerial skills generate a high alpha per unit of risk (a/σ 2 is large). One can see from (2.16) that in this case, realized returns have a large impact on investors' beliefs. Second, the manager's skills are sufficiently scalable (α is large). In this case, good news about her skills translate into a large increase in expected future fund size, and thus into large future expected profits. Finally, the manager should be sufficiently impatient (r is large). If the manager is patient, she cares only for the long run in which she ends up with the reputation that she deserves regardless of her earlier attempts to gamble. In this regard, it is worth noticing that condition r > α(α−1)a 2 2σ 2 in (2.15) is only a sufficient condition for risk shifting. Numerical analysis shows that the manager is tempted to gamble under much milder conditions on r when a/σ 2 > 1/α is satisfied.
To assess whether the risk-shifting friction is likely to be important in practice, we consider a calibration consistent with that of Berk and Green. We set α = 2, a = 5%, σ = 25%, and r = 5%. Simple calculations then show that conditions (2.15) are satisfied. More generally, condition a/σ 2 > 1/α is very likely to be satisfied in practice. It holds whenever the Sharpe ratio of a portfolio strategy is larger than its volatility (a/σ > σ), which is true for almost all investment strategies. In sum, this suggests that risk shifting matters in this model for parameter values that are empirically plausible.
Equilibria with Risk Shifting
Proposition 4 establishes that under the plausible conditions (2.15), an equilibrium without gambling does not exist. This raises the following questions: Under these conditions, which gambles emerge in equilibrium? How does gambling in equilibrium affect social learning and the distribution of realized returns? To answer these questions, we consider a reduced-form version of our model. It allows us to abstract from complex signalling issues that would arise in an infinite horizon dynamic model and yet, yields interesting insights into equilibrium gambling strategies.
1 Specifically, we study the following static model. We assume that the manager makes only one investment decision: She can invest one unit of capital using one of two technologies. She can either use an alpha-generating technology, which produces a gross return
where again θ ∈ {0; 1} is the unknown ability of the manager. Alternatively, she can invest her funds in the risk shifting technology that enables her to generate a gross return with any arbitrary distribution over [0, +∞) with unit mean. Investors and the manager share the common prior beliefs π 0 that the manager is skilled (θ = 1). Upon observing the return R realized by the manager -but without knowing if she gambled or used the alpha-generating technology -investors update their beliefs about the manager's skills. As before, we denote π R 1 = Prob{θ = 1|R} the investors' posterior belief that θ = 1, and refer to it as the manager's reputation.
We assume that the manager invests so as to maximize the sum of her expected current return R and a reduced-form continuation utility that is proportional to her reputation π
Assuming a continuation utility that is linear in reputation is commonplace in the career concern literature (see, e.g., Dasgupta 1 In an equilibrium with gambling, unlike in an equilibrium without gambling, the manager and investors have different information about the manager's ability. While the manager knows if she gambled or not, investors can only imperfectly infer this from the observed returns. This creates room for signalling, whereby a truly skilled manager would like to credibly separate herself from a lucky gambler. Solving for such equilibria with asymmetric information is a very difficult problem and is beyond the scope of this paper.
We now assume that the conditions in Lemma 3 are satisfied, and characterize an equilibrium with gambling. Notice first that in any such equilibrium, the manager cannot gamble with probability 1. If this were the case, then investors would not update their beliefs about her skills and the manager would expect to earn only 1 + π 0 /γ. The manager then would be better off with a deviation that consists in using the alpha-generating technology because it would generate a positive excess return while preserving the same reputation.
Notice also that if the manager gambles, she should choose a distribution that has no atoms other than at zero. Otherwise, investors would infer that the manager almost surely gambled when a return at such an atom is realized, and would not update their beliefs about the manager's skills. But then, this would defeat the purpose of gambling to manipulate her reputation.
The above two observations imply that the investment strategy of the manager can be summarized as follows. The manager invests in her alpha-generating technology with probability (1 − q) and gambles with probability q ∈ (0, 1) . In the latter case, she chooses a gamble that pays off 0 with probability x ≥ 0 and, conditionally on not yielding 0, admits an atomless density ϕ over [0, ∞). The following lemma further characterizes this strategy.
Lemma 4
The gamble yields 0 with a positive probability (x > 0). The density ϕ is single-peaked and has support [z 1 , z 2 ], where 1 < z 1 < z 2 .
Lemma 4 shows that equilibria with risk shifting involve trading strategies that consist exactly in taking on hidden tail risk. With some probability, the manager sells disaster insurance. She uses the insurance premium to generate a noisy excess return if the disaster does not occur. Upon observing such fake excess returns, investors still revise their views about the manager's skills upwards because the manager also uses her alpha-generating technology with some probability.
The proof of Lemma 4 provides an analytical expression for ϕ. Here we consider a numerical example. We assume the following parameter values: σ = 10%, a = 2σ 2 = 2%, π 0 = 40%, and γ = 10%. First, we check that with these parameter values, an equilibrium without gambling does not exist. Suppose, by contradiction, that such an equilibrium exists. In this case, after observing a return R, investors form a posterior belief about the manager's skills as . It is increasing in R and is first convex and then concave. If the manager does not gamble and invests in the efficient technology, her expected future reputation coincides with the current reputation, and is π 0 . The electronic appendix offers a simple procedure to check whether the manager can enhance her expected reputation by resorting to gambling. This procedure consists in finding the straight line that has the smallest value at 1 among all the straight lines that are above the graph of π R 1 . The manager manipulates her reputation if and only if this straight line takes a value strictly larger than π 0 at R = 1. An optimal gamble has its support included in the set where this line coincides with π R 1 . Panel (a) shows that in our example, there is an optimal gamble which delivers either 0 or a gross return of 1.23 with probability of 80%. The expected reputation from such a gamble is 40.6% > 40%. The gains in expected reputation from gambling comes at the cost of the lower expected returns. If the manager gambles, the expected return is only 1, while it is π 0 e a + (1 − π 0 ) = 1.008 if she uses the alpha-generating technology.
Because the cost is smaller than the reputation gain, an equilibrium without gambling is not sustainable. Next, we solve for the manager's equilibrium strategy with randomized gambling. . In equilibrium, the manager gambles with probability q = 5.6%. When she gambles, the manager loses everything with probability x = 8.8% and obtains an excess return between 2% and 49% with a density shown in Figure 1 Figure 1 Panel (b) . The unconditional probability that the manager goes bust is q × x = 0.5%. Thus, the manager trades an excess return with probability 99.5% with the risk of losing everything.
While binary gambles are optimal deviations in an equilibrium in which investors believe that the manager does not gamble, the equilibrium gambles are not binary because they would be detected by investors. The equilibrium posterior with gambling is flatter than the one without gambling in the region [1.02, 1.49] , where the returns from gambling realize. As a result, learning about the managerial skills is slower in the equilibrium with gambling.
What Are the Costs of Risk Shifting?
The results of Sections 2.2 and 2.3 suggest that there are three types of costs associated with risk shifting induced by career concerns in delegated asset management. First, realized returns are riskier in equilibria with gambling. While in our setting investors are risk-neutral, it would be straightforward to extend our model to one in which investors are risk-averse. In this case, additional risk would be costly to them, unless one assumes that gambles are purely idiosyncratic and that investors can diversify them away. From a financial stability perspective (which is outside our model), the most worrying aspect of equilibrium risk shifting is that it thickens the left tail of returns, since the manager finances small and frequent positive excess returns with rare but devastating losses. When such incentives prevail within institutions that have legal access to the public safety nets, or that are too big or too systemic too fail, the induced cost for taxpayers of the occurrence of such fat-tailed returns can be very high.
Second, the manager may give up pursuing alpha-generating strategies and invest instead in fairly priced portfolios, which have a risk profile better suited for manipulation of her reputation. As a result, markets may not be as efficient as they would be if the manager tried to correct mispricing.
Finally, gambling in equilibrium slows down the discovery of the managerial skills because the manager applies them less often. This leads to a less efficient capital allocation.
Long-Term Contracts and Risk Shifting
The previous section shows that risk shifting reduces the gains from matching "brains and resources" through delegated asset management, and that it generates significant tail risk for financial institutions. It also shows that risk shifting is likely to occur in equilibrium if only one-period contracts are used.
This section introduces the possibility of long-term contracting. We perform two distinct exercises. First, we study the risk-taking incentives induced by performance fees with high-water marks that are commonplace in the hedge fund industry. We show that this contract does not eliminate the risk-shifting incentives created by the flow-performance relationship. Second, we solve for optimal contracts that eliminate risk shifting even when conditions (2.15) are satisfied.
For simplicity, this section restricts the analysis to the case in which the alphagenerating technology is such that α = 1 in (2.2). In this case, reputation affects the manager's expected alpha, but not the optimal fund size which is constant and equal to 1.
Performance Fees with High-Water Marks
The typical fee structure in the hedge fund industry usually includes a management fee and a performance fee. Management fees are a fixed fraction of the fund's net asset value ranging from 1% to 4% per annum, and are meant to cover the fund's operating costs. The performance fee is a fraction of the fund's profits over a given year, ranging from 15% to 50%. The most widespread combination is a 2% management fee and a 20% performance fee, the so called 2-20 contract. The performance fee typically includes a "high-water mark" (HWM) provision, meaning that the fee applies only to the profits in excess of the cumulative losses over the previous years. The goal of this section is to study whether the performance fees are conducive to risk shifting in our model.
Because the terms of the contract are usually fixed, the manager, in general, does not extract the maximum expected surplus but leaves some surplus to investors. This would not be possible with the one-sided commitment assumed thus far as the manager would enter in a new contract with higher fees if her reputation improves. Such renegotiation by hedge fund managers is not only a theoretical possibility. In practice, managers do adjust their fees in response to their performance. There is also ample anecdotal evidence that fund managers tend to close funds that have underperformed so as to reset the high-water mark.
2 Nevertheless, to provide a meaningful analysis, we assume in this Section 3.1 only that both investors and the manager agree on the fees and can commit not to renegotiate them. To understand the risk-taking incentives created by the performance fee, we first consider a situation in which there are no new inflows after the manager and investors sign the contract at date 0. Specifically, assume that both the manager and investor can commit to the following contract: (i) At date 0, investors make an initial unit investment in the fund; (ii) The manager receives a performance fee k with a highwater mark equal to 1 and returns the fraction of the fund value in excess of 1 that she does not receive as a performance fee to investors; (iii) There are no new inflows to the fund.
Under the above contract, if the manager uses the alpha-generating technology, the fund size (q t ) t≥0 evolves as:
1)
H t is the fund value in excess of 1 that is redeemed to investors after the performance fee is paid. It is a non-decreasing adapted process that increases only when q t exceeds the optimal fund size equal to 1. At any date t, the continuation utility of the manager is
The next proposition computes this utility W t and shows that the manager never finds it worth gambling in this case.
Proposition 5 Suppose that the manager commits to the contract described in (i), (ii), and (iii) above. Then she never never finds gambling worthwhile and her continuation utility is
Proposition 5 shows that without new inflows, a performance fee with a high-water mark is never sufficiently convex to trigger gambling. A similar result was established by Panageas and Westerfield (2007) . Although our results are closely related, our environment differs from that in Panageas and Westerfield along several dimensions that are interesting to discuss.
Panageas and Westerfield also consider a risk-neutral fund manager who is compensated according to (3.3) . The manager cannot secretly gamble but she can take positions in a risk-free asset and in a risky asset that carries an exogenous constant excess return. Panageas and Westerfield find that despite risk neutrality, the manager optimally maintains a finite and constant leverage. One way to understand their result is to notice that the performance fee with high-water mark can be viewed as a continuum of call options with varying maturities. An increase in risk raises the value of the options with the closest maturity but it also increases the possibility that more remote options will become far out-of-the money in case of adverse realizations. The resulting trade-off yields a constant leverage that depends both on the manager's discount rate and on the excess return on the risky asset. When the latter goes to zero, Panageas and Westerfield show that the optimal leverage goes to infinity. This result, however, crucially depends on the assumption that the manager's discount rate is strictly greater than the risk-free rate.
If the manager had a discount rate greater than r in our setting, then she would find it optimal to gamble as her reputation deteriorates. In our model, as the manager's reputation declines, the perceived expected return on the alpha-generating technology goes to zero. Thus at some point, the manager would choose to forfeit investing into a technology that provides a small excess return but limited risk in favour of gambles with unrestricted risk-taking possibilities. This does not occur here only because the manager's discount rate is equal to the risk-free rate. In this case, the manager never trades however small expected excess return for more risk.
Proposition 5 may suggest that the HWM contract does not lead to gambling. This conclusion, however, reverts if fund inflows enter the picture. The case of α = 1 is especially illustrative and simple. Provided that the reputation of the manager is high enough to cover her performance fees, investors would always be willing to supply funds until the assets under management reach their optimal size equal to one. This drastically reduces the penalty from realizing negative returns and therefore, from gambling.
To be specific, suppose that the manager has an option to reopen her fund once to new investors. Let q * be the fund size when she decides to reopen. Then the manager raises 1 − q * units of fresh capital with a new high-water mark set to zero (provided that her reputation is high enough). We assume that the new investors are the first to withdraw their capital if the total fund size exceeds the optimal fund size of one. 
6)
When the stake of the old investors reaches one, they become the sole investors in the fund again, and their capital evolves according to (3.1) and (3.2). Denote this moment as τ. Then the manager's expected fees from new investors from the time t when she reopens the fund is
with H t given by (3.7). The present value of the option to reopen the fund is then
where ν q * denote the time when the funds of the original investors reach level q * . The q * , which solves (3.9), determines the fund size at which the manager should exercise her option. While W n is decreasing in q * and reaches maximum at q * = 0, Ee −rν q * is increasing in q * . The manager thus faces a trade off between the value of the option to reopen the fund and its probability. If the manager gambles and realizes a low return, the manager can exercise her option immediately, which greatly reduces the cost of gambling. We have Proposition 6 Suppose that the manager has an option to reopen the fund once to new investors who supply funds as long as they expect to break even. Suppose that r > σ 2 /10. Then there exist π such that for all π ≥ π, a manager with reputation π gambles.
Thus, the option to receive more inflows, be it only once, is enough to create gambling incentives. This suggests that typical performance fees may be problematic in practice given that hedge funds are typically open-ended and do actually have the option to increase their capital.
Optimal Contract with Contingent Bonus Deferral
Under the strong -and, in our view, unrealistic -assumption that the manager can commit not to renegotiate a contract after her reputation has improved, very simple contracts can eliminate risk shifting. For example, fully insuring the manager by guaranteeing a fixed wage equal to aπ 0 per period would eliminate any incentives to gamble. This is not feasible in the more realistic environment with one-sided commitment considered here. The manager will walk away from such an insurance contract as soon as her reputation improves.
When commitment is one-sided, contracts must be structured in such a way that the continuation utility of the manager at any date is at least as large as her outside options given her current reputation. This implies that a contract for a given initial π 0 cannot be determined in isolation. Instead, all contracts for all initial skill levels depend on each other through the channel of managerial outside options. In this section, we present contracts that eliminate risk shifting. They exploit the fact that the impact of gambling on investors beliefs vanishes in the long run.
Before constructing these contracts, we illustrate the way they work with the following simpler contract. Suppose that investors and the manager sign the following contract at date 0. The investors commit to invest one unit in the fund at each date between 0 and T . The manager does not receive any payment until date T , at which she receives a single payment w T such that:
Suppose, for now only, that after this date T the manager no longer works. The date-0 present value of the payment is
which is exactly the present value of the excess returns that investors expect to receive between 0 and T if the manager uses her alpha-generating technology throughout. The contract resembles a deferred bonus with clawback provisions, whereby the manager receives a single terminal payment that is contingent on her entire track record over the period [0, T ], as summarized by π T . Consider the manager's incentives to gamble at date 0 given such a contract. As in (2.13), if the manager decides to gamble she chooses the distribution µ that solves:
The integrand in (3.11) is first convex and then concave in x. We show in the electronic appendix that this implies that the optimal gamble is a simple binary gamble such that for some R > 1, the manager earns R with probability 1/R, and loses everything otherwise. Thus, the manager will not be tempted to gamble at date 0 if and only if
The following lemma establishes important properties of ψ(π, T ).
Lemma 5 For all π ∈ (0, 1), the function ψ(π, T ) decreases with respect to T , and is equal to π for T sufficiently large. Furthermore, there exists π such that for all π ≥ π ψ(π, 0) = π.
Because ψ(π, T ) decreases with respect to T, date-0 gambling becomes less appealing as the payment date gets more remote. This formalizes the insight that the impact of gambling on investors' beliefs diminishes over time. Lemma 5 implies, in particular that we can define for all π τ (π) ≡ inf {t ≥ 0 s.t. ψ(π, t) = π} .
(3.14)
The manager does not gamble at date 0 provided T ≥ τ (π 0 ). We are now ready to define an optimal contract. There are two issues that the fixeddate single-payment contract studied above does not address. First, while setting the payment date at τ (π 0 ) deters date-0 gambling, there is no guarantee that the manager will not be tempted to gamble as she gets closer to the payment date. Second, one needs to check that if the manager enters into a new single-payment contract after the current one expires, this does not affect her incentives to gamble within the current contract.
We construct the optimal contract as follows. At date 0, the investors commit to pay w T 0 = aπ T 0 r e rT 0 − 1 at a random date T 0 which is defined as follows. Initially, T 0 is equal to τ (π 0 ). Then for all n ≥ 1, if T (n−1)∆t = 1, then the payment is made and the contract is over. Otherwise the date is revised as T n∆t = max T (n−1)∆t − 1; τ (π n∆t ) . After the payment of this current contract is made, a new similar contract is initiated at date T with initial reputation π T . We have:
Proposition 7 If the manager is compensated according to a sequence of single-payment contracts such that a contract that starts at date t promises the payment
at a random date T defined as above, she never gambles and extracts the maximum expected surplus.
Proof. Investors can commit to this contract because by construction, investors break even ex-ante. So we only need to prove two remaining results: first that the manager's continuation utility is higher than her outside option at any date, second that the manager never finds it optimal to gamble. To see the first point, define the random payment date of the current contract as T . At date t, the manager expects to receive:
To see the second point, observe that by construction, the random payment date T is such that the manager has no incentives to gamble so as to increase the expected payment from the current contract. It may still be the case that the manager could find it worthwhile gambling so as to increase her expected payoff on the subsequent contracts that will follow after the terminal payment of the current one is made. Notice that from Lemma 5, the case that it is the most conducive to gambling would be if all the payments from subsequent contracts were made once for all at date T . But even in this case, the expected payment is
, which is proportional to w T = aπ T r e rT − 1 , and thus not conducive to gambling. QED Notice that this contract can be implemented in practice with share grants to the manager instead of cash bonuses provided that i) the manager is sufficiently senior or important within the firm that her decisions do affect the share price, ii) the vesting schedule is stochastic, depending on the manager's entire track record as described above.
It is interesting to compare this contract with the one that emerges from models of dynamic moral hazard such as, for example, DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) or He (2009) . In these models, an agent may secretly divert cash flows instead of reporting her entire output to the principal. The optimal contract in this case consists, as in ours, in adjusting the present value of the future payments promised to the agent as her track record evolves.
However, the timing conditions of the future payments are very different in those contracts and in our contract. While in our contract, it is crucial that the investors can commit to not accelerate the timing of payments upon observing a stellar performance, in moral-hazard models, a stellar track record results in accelerated payments to the agent.
This difference arises because the contracts are driven by different economic considerations. In our model, a stream of fixed promised payments would completely eliminate any risk-shifting incentives. However, such fixed payments are not viable because investors are forced to adjust the manager's continuation value as her reputation improves. If not, a good track record would lead the manager to repudiate her current labor contract and sign a new one that reflects her new improved reputation. The necessity to adjust the continuation value creates risk-shifting incentives that the investors' commitment to defer payments can address.
In contrast, in moral-hazard models, an adjustment of continuation values is meant to provide the agent with incentives to report the highest possible output instead of diverting some of it. Thus, the sooner the agent reports high income, the better.
Current Financial Reforms and Contingent Bonus Deferral Contract
There is a widely shared view that inappropriate compensation schemes within the financial services industry were one of the ingredients that led to the crisis that erupted in 2008. According to "Principles for Sound Compensation Practices," published by the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) and summarizing the outcome of multiple surveys of financial institutions "over 80 percent of market participants believe that compensation practices played a role in promoting the accumulation of risks that led to the current crisis."
In the face of these compensation issues, public authorities around the world have issued guidelines for compensation reforms. These guidelines prominently feature the deferral of bonuses and the introduction of clawback mechanisms. For example, in the U.S., the Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies, jointly issued by several authorities, 4 lists four methods to make compensation more sensitive to risk, among which "deferral of payment" with explicit mention of clawbacks, "longer performance periods", and a "reduced sensitivity to short-term performance". The Financial Stability Forum points at similar tools, and writes: "One way to align time horizons is to place a portion, and in some cases up to the entirety, of any given year's bonus grant, both cash and equity, into the equivalent of an escrow account. All or part of the grant is reversed if the firm as a whole performs poorly or if the exposures the employee caused the firm to assume in the year for which the bonus was granted perform poorly (a "clawback")."
The industry gradually follows this guidance. The International Institute of Finance, surveying the practices of 37 financial institutions representing more than half of global banking activity, concludes 5 : "The industry has begun to take steps to strengthen the link between delivery of deferred compensation and the continued performance of the individual. Over 40% of the firms surveyed include performance-based criteria in their deferred compensation schemes, although in a majority of cases this takes simply the form of a penalty for gross misconduct or large-scale unexpected losses. A number of firms have developed more sophisticated approaches that incorporate a final payout multiplier that adjusts compensation up or down based on current year or historical performance." Interestingly, the stochastic payment dates that we introduce in this section strongly resemble this introduction of bonus deferral and clawbacks. While our optimal contract is close in spirit to these reforms, we believe that it also introduces some important caveats. Our model suggests that setting once for all the bonus payment date is in general not optimal, even if the terminal bonus is adjusted for subsequent performance.
It is important to commit, in addition, to adjust the payment date as history unfolds. For example our analysis shows that a three-year deferral might induce excessive risk taking at the end of year 2 if the manager has not performed well and the bonus is due in one year.
Conclusion
Financial innovation has come under severe criticism after the crisis that erupted in 2007. Several papers document that a number of structured products seemed mostly aimed at exploiting investors' weaknesses or ignorance. 6 In this paper, we suggest that financial innovations, by enlarging the set of financial instruments available to fund managers, may exacerbate agency costs even when investors are sophisticated, provided that investors cannot perfectly monitor the positions of the fund managers. We introduce a novel framework to study this agency problem between managers and investors. In this framework, managers' compensation depends on investors' perception of their ability to generate excess returns above a fair compensation for risk (alpha). The managers can temporarily distort the perception of these alpha-generating skills by trading a rich menu of financial instruments.
The model delivers two main implications. First, absent careful contracting, this friction may lead managers to take on hidden tail risk so as to temporarily distort their perceived skills. Second, while current compensation reforms based on the deferral and clawback of bonuses seem to be an appropriate tool to address this issue, these reforms, in their current form, miss that the payment dates must be dynamically adjusted as the cumulative performance of the manager evolves.
In general, there are other ways than compensation design to deal with risk shifting in delegated asset management. Possible solutions include increased transparency, or restrictions on the set of instruments that managers can trade. In this paper we focus on solving the risk-shifting problem using compensation design only. This makes the problem more challenging. Future research could combine optimal contracting with these additional means of addressing the risk-shifting problem. On the other hand, we assume that positions are always valued at a fair market price. Instruments that are more difficult to value such as illiquid securities or exotic derivative contracts would likely provide fund managers with additional risk-shifting incentives if trading losses can be concealed for some time. Future research could further explore these channels to engage in risk transformation.
Appendix: Proofs Proof of Lemma 1
As ∆t → 0, the optimal fund size and maximal expected surplus solve
Proof of Proposition 1
We first show point-wise convergence. That is, we establish (2.6) for a fixed π 0 = π. By Bayes' theorem, π n∆t , the perceived skills at date n∆t, satisfy
is the likelihood ratio process. Let us introduce the continuous-time process (π t ) t≥0 that obeys
is a standard Wiener process under the agents' filtration (see Liptser and Shiryaev (1978) ). Further, as ∆t → 0 and n∆t → t, π n∆t → π t a.s. (see Liptser and Shiryaev (1978) ). Hence, V (π) can be re-written as
By the Feynman-Kac formula, the function V solves the following linear second-order differential equation:
From (A44) it follows that
The corresponding homogeneous equation
has two regular singular points at 0 and 1. The solutions of the homogeneous equation are linear combinations of the two independent solutions
From here, formulas (2.6) and (2.7) are standard results in the theory of inhomogeneous differential equations. The function G is the Dirichlet-Green function for the differential operator associated with the homogeneous differential equation (see, e.g., Driver (2003) ). We now show that V (π, ∆t) converges to V (π) uniformly in π as ∆t → 0. We have
Thus it enough to show that ∀ε > 0, ∃∆t such that ∀∆t < ∆t and ∀π ∈ [0, 1]
By change of variables (A7) can be re-written as
Since v is continuous over [0,1] and thus uniformly continuous, it is enough to show that ∀π ∈ [0, 1] and ∀ε > 0, ∃∆t such that ∀∆t < ∆t
which follows from the weak convergence of the measures induced by B s to the measure concentrated at 0 as s → 0. QED.
Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose that investors believe that the manager invests in her private technology. In this case, if the manager does invest in her private technology then π t evolves according to (A44). If, on the other hand, she invests in the risk-free asset, π t evolves as
Suppose that at time t the manager allocates x t percentage of her funds to her alphagenerating technology and invests the rest in the risk-free asset. Then her continuation utility is
The optimal investment policy x t that maximizes (A10) satisfies the HJB equation:
Therefore, at the optimal investment policy x t , rV (π, x) ≥ v(π). Thus (A11) implies that the optimal policy is indeed x t ≡ 1. QED.
Proof of Proposition 3
Suppose that the manager gambles and realizes a return R over [0, ∆t] , and from then on invests in her alpha-generating technology. Let π R n∆t n∈N denote the process -under the manager's filtration -of her skills as perceived by investors who believe instead that she has invested in her storage technology at date 0. These investors believe that
∆t+σB ∆t .
From (A1) and (A2) it follows that
As ∆t → 0
, and lim
Proof of Proposition 4
Part 1. We first show that if σ 2 > αa then the manager does not engage in risk shifting. Proposition 2 demonstrates that the manager will not invest in the alternative technology at the risk-free rate, provided that r < r − σ 2 /2. We now show that she will not invest in any risky gamble as well. Suppose the manager believes that she is skilled with probability π. At the same time, suppose that investors believe that the manager is skilled with probability π and that the manager never engages in risk shifting. We show that the manager has no incentives to deviate by taking a one-shot risky gamble in this case. Suppose the manager takes a gamble and realizes return R. Let W (π, π , R, ∆t) be the expected utility of the manager conditional on realization a first-period return R. Similar to the proof of Proposition 3 one can show that investors' perception of the manager's skills π
Proposition 1 then implies that
Differentiating twice w.r.t. R shows that this function is concave in R when σ 2 ≥ αa.
Hence the manager has no incentives to take a one-shot risky gamble in this case. Because this holds for arbitrary heterogeneous priors π, π , this implies that multiperiod deviations cannot be desirable by backward induction. Part 2. We now show that if σ 2 < αa, rσ 2 > a 2 2 α (α − 1) then for π 0 = π small enough, there exists a one-period gamble which makes the manager better off. Let R = (1 − ρ)
−σ 2 /a , ρ ∈ [0, 1). Consider the following gamble:
From (A15) the expected net gain from the above one-period gamble over perpetual investment in the efficient storage technology is
Since σ 2 < αa, there existsx and some ρ ∈ (0, 1) such that for all x ∈ [0,x],
(1− ρ(1−x)) α > 1 + ε for some ε > 0 and therefore, u(x, ρ) > ε > 0. Thus for π small enough
Using (2.7) we have
α (α − 1) implies that ψ > 2α − 1. Therefore, the integral
diverges as π → 0. In this case, its sign is determined by the sign of u(·, ρ) in the neighborhood of 0, which is positive. Thus, the net gain from the gamble is positive. QED.
Proof of Lemma 3
Suppose that investors believe that the manager does not gamble. Then their posterior probability about her ability upon observing R is
If the manager does not gamble, she expects to get
Consider π 0 such that
Suppose that the manager deviates and enters into a gamble that generates gross return 
Comparing (A21) with (A19) one can see that the manager obtains a higher utility if she gambles, provided that (A20) holds. QED.
Proof of Lemma 4
We solve for an equilibrium in which the manager invests in her private technology with probability 1 − q and gambles otherwise. If the manager gambles, she receives 0 with probability x and a return between z and z + dz with probability (1 − x)ϕ(z)dz.
For the ease of computations, we write ϕ(z) as
where g(z) ≥ 0. In such an equilibrium, upon observing a realized return z, investors' posterior is
Let E µ (E 0 ) be the expectation operator if the manager gambles (invests in her alpha-generating technology). When the manager gambles she takes the investors' posterior π 1 in (A23) as given and chooses a gamble that solves
We show in the electronic appendix that the solution to this problem coincides with the solution to its dual problem:
where A and B are some real numbers. The dual problem admits a simple and practical interpretation: it minimizes the value at 1 of a straight line that is above the graph of π 1 (z). The optimal gamble then has its support included in the set where this line coincides with π 1 (z). We also show in the electronic appendix that this solution can be realized with a binary gamble. In this particular case, a binary gamble cannot be the equilibrium solution, however, because it would be detected. Thus it must be that π 1 (z) has linear portions that coincide with the minimal straight line A + Bz.
Given that π 1 (z) is first convex then concave, it is easy to see that there must be two real numbers z 1 and z 2 such that π 1 (z) = Bz for z ∈ 0 ∪ [z 1 , z 2 ] and π 1 (z) < Bz otherwise. Figure 1 Panel (b) illustrates this for a particular numerical example. The interval [z 1 , z 2 ] is the support of the gamble when it does not yield 0.
We are now ready to solve for the manager's gambling strategy. We first determine B. Direct computations show
Because the manager randomizes between gambling and investing in her alpha-generating technology, it must be that she is indifferent between gambling or investing efficiently:
(A25) and (A26) together imply that
Since π 1 (z) = Bz for z ∈ 0 ∪ [z 1 , z 2 ], we can solve for g(z) from (A23):
Continuity of π 1 (z) implies that it must be that
Notice that because a > σ 2 , equation (A29) can have at most two solutions.
We are left with two free parameters: q and x. There are determined in equilibrium from (i) requiring ϕ(z) to be a density and (ii) requiring the gamble to have expected return equal to 1:
Proof of Lemma 5
For any bounded function g :
By the Feynman-Kac formula, the function ψ(t, π) solves the following PDE:
A general solution to (A32) is
Equation (A34) implies that ϕ(π, t) is a decreasing function of time if C(ν) = 0 for ν = {0, 1}. Next, we show that
|π 0 = π is equal to π 0 for t large enough. It is clear that we need to consider only R <
where the last equality follows from (A34) and (A35). Equations (A36) and (A37) imply that
Notice that one can always choose t large enough so that the RHS of (A38) is less or equal than 0 for any R ∈ [1,
]. QED.
Lemma 6
Lemma 6 Suppose condition 2.15 holds. Then there exists a finite limit
Proof. We have
where ψ is defined in (2.8). Further
Proof of Proposition 5
First, suppose that the manager is skilled so that the excess return on the alphagenerating technology is a. Whenever q t < 1 the manager's continuation utility is a martingale and therefore solves
The ODE (A40) has a general solution of the form
where the constants ρ + and ρ − solve the quadratic equation:
Solving (A41), we have
There are two boundary conditions (at 0 and at q = 1):
Thus,
If the manager is unskilled then a = 0 and ρ = 1. Thus if the manager is skilled with probability π t then her continuation utility is
Proof of Proposition 6
First, we compute the expected surplus that the manager expects to get from new investors if she reopens her fund when its size is q * . As in Proposition 5, we first consider the case in which the manager is skilled with probability one. Let x t = ln(q o t /q * ). Then
Let m t be the running maximum of x t , m t = max 0≤s≤t x t . The manager is paid whenever x t = m t . Whenever x t < m t the manager's continuation utility follows a martingale and therefore solves
The ODE (A46) has a general solution of the form
where the constants ρ + and ρ − solve the quadratic equation (A41), and therefore are as in (A42). f (m t ) and g(m t ) are arbitrary functions of m t . Because lim xt→−∞ W n (x t ) = 0 it must be that g(m t ) ≡ 0. Without loss of generality, the solution then is
The boundary condition at
A general solution to (A47) is
where C is a constant. When q o t reaches 1 for the first time, the stake of the new investors in the fund becomes zero. It implies that f (− ln(q * )) = 0, and therefore
where h t = q * e mt . Thus Cox and Miller (1965) show that
Thus, the present value of the opportunity to reopen the fund at date 0 if the manager uses only her alpha-generating technology is
Suppose at time 0, the manager takes a gamble that deliver a gross return q * < 1 with probability p and a gross return 1 + p(1 − q * )/(1 − p) with probability (1 − p). Suppose also that if the return q * is realized then the manager reopens the fund. Then the expected continuation utility of the manager is
The manager will gamble if and only if the above utility is greater than her expected utility if she does not gamble. Thus she will gamble if and only if
Direct computations show that
The supremum is achieved at q * = 0. So the skilled manager will gamble if V < 1. By looking at ρ and ρ − one can see that they depend only on r/σ 2 and a/σ 2 . Let λ = r/σ 2 and µ = a/σ 2 . One can show by direct but tedious calculations that as long as λ > 0.1, V < 1. Instead, here we resort to numerical analysis. The figure below shows the plot of V as a function of λ and µ over the range of λ ∈ [0.1, 10] and µ ∈ [0, 10]. One can see that for each parameter value in this range, V is indeed smaller than 1. Thus, the skilled manager will be tempted to gamble. As a result, any manager with a sufficiently high reputation will be tempted to gamble as well. QED.
Internet Appendix for
"Rewarding Trading Skills Without Inducing Gambling"
Optimal Risk Shifting -The Dual Approach
In this Appendix, we solve for the optimal payoff distribution, holding the mean constant, chosen by an agent who seeks to maximize the expected value of a function U over this payoff. Formally, let M denote the set of Borelian probability measures over [0, +∞). We seek to solve for the following problem:
Given the primal problem (B1), its dual problem takes the following form:
where z 1 and z 2 are some real numbers. Let P (U ) and P * (U ) denote the solution of the primal and dual problems correspondingly. The dual problem minimizes the value at 1 of a straight line that is above the graph of U . The next Proposition shows that under the mild restriction (B3) on the utility function U , solutions to the primal and dual problems coincide. Thus the dual approach generates a simple and practical determination of P (U ). The role of condition (B3) is to ensure that the infimum is reached in the dual problem (B2). Graphically, it means that the function U does not have an asymptote with a strictly positive slope. 
then P (U ) = P * (U ).
Proof.
Observe that condition (B3) implies that the set Z = {(z 1 , z 2 ) : ∀y ≥ 0, z 1 + yz 2 ≥ U (y)} is nonempty, closed, and there exists K such that (z 1 , z 2 ) ∈ Z → z 1 ≥ K, z 2 ≥ K.
The function (z 1 , z 2 ) → z 1 + z 2 is continuous. Thus, there exists (z * 1 , z * 2 ) ∈ Z such that P * (U ) = z 1 + z 2 . Condition (B3) readily implies that z 2 ≥ 0.
Let µ be a probability measure that satisfies (B1). Since for any probability measure µ that satisfies (B1):
it implies that P * (U ) ≥ P (U ).
Let us show that the reverse inequality also holds. Without loss of generality, we assume that U has a compact support (for all U satisfying (B3), there clearly exists a continuous function V that has a compact support and such that V ≤ U and P * (V ) = P * (U )). It is straightforward to see that 1. P * (U 1 ) ≤ P * (U 2 ) for U 1 , U 2 such that U 1 ≤ U 2 , 2. P * (λU ) = λP * (U ) for U and λ ∈ [0, +∞), 3. P * (U 1 + U 2 ) ≤ P * (U 1 ) + P * (U 2 ) for U 1 , U 2 . 
Clearly,
Letting M → +∞ implies
and thus
Proposition 9 Assume U satisfies (B3), and is continuous and increasing. If the solution to the problem (B1) is non-degenerate (µ(1) = 1) then P (U ) can be attained with a binary payoff. Moreover, if U is twice differentiable and has at most one inflexion point, then a necessary and sufficient condition for the solution to (B1) to be non-degenerate is that U (1) > U (1) − U (0). The binary payoff in this case is of the form {0, R}, where R > 1.
Let a continuous increasing function U satisfy condition (B3). Let (z 1 , z 2 ) ∈ R 2 be the solution to the dual problem (B2) associated with U . Clearly, z 2 > 0. Let S = {y ≥ 0 : z 1 + z 2 y = U (y)} .
Condition B3 and continuity of U imply that S is a nonempty compact set. Let y 1 = min S, y 2 = max S.
We now proceed in two steps.
Step 1. First, we show that y 1 ≤ 1 ≤ y 2 . We prove that y 2 ≥ 1. The proof that y 1 ≤ 1 is symmetric. Suppose the opposite that y 2 < 1 then for some ε ∈ (0, 1 − y 2 ) , let η (ε) = min
Condition B3 and continuity of U imply that η (ε) > 0. Define (z 1 , z 2 ) as z 1 = z 1 + (y 2 + ε) η (ε) , z 2 = z 2 − η (ε) . The pair (z 1 , z 2 ) satisfies (B2). To see this, notice that z 1 + yz 2 = z 1 + yz 2 + η (ε) (y 2 + ε − y) . Thus z 1 + yz 2 > z 1 + yz 2 ≥ U (y) for y < y 2 + ε. Further, z 1 + yz 2 ≥ z 1 + yz 2 − η (ε) y ≥ U (y) for y ≥ y 2 + ε by definition of η (ε) . At the same time, z 1 + z 2 = z 1 + z 2 + (y 2 + ε − 1) η (ε) < z 1 + z 2 , which contradicts the definition of (z 1 , z 2 ). Thus it must be that y 2 ≥ 1.
Step 2. If y 1 = y 2 , then Step 1 implies that S = {1} , and the gamble is degenerate.
If y 1 < y 2 , we have z 1 + y 1 z 2 = U (y 1 ), z 1 + y 2 z 2 = U (y 2 ), so that z 1 + z 2 = 1 − y 1 y 2 − y 1 U (y 2 ) + y 2 − 1 y 2 − y 1 U (y 1 ).
From (B4), P (U ) = P * (U ) is attained with a payoff equal to y 1 with probability
and y 2 with probability 1−y 1 y 2 −y 1 . We now prove the last part of the proposition. If U has at most one inflexion point, condition (B3) implies that U is either concave -in which case the gamble is degenerate -or convex then concave. Consider the latter case. If the solution is degenerate then P * (U ) must be solved by the tangent to U at 1, which requires U (1) ≤ U (1) − U (0).
Suppose now that U (1) ≤ U (1) − U (0). It implies that U is concave over [1, +∞) (because U (y)−U (0) y is decreasing in y = 1). In this case, the tangent to U at 1 solves P * (U ), so the gamble is degenerate. Finally, if the solution is nondegenerate then it is attained with a tangent that starts at 0. QED. take into account that the manager gambles. In equilibrium, the manager gambles with probability q = 5.6%. When she gambles, the manager loses everything with probability x = 8.8% and obtains an gross return between 1.02 and 1.49. Panel (c) shows the gamble's density.
